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THE PRESIDENT AND THE AUTOPEN: IT IS
UNCONSITUTIONAL FOR SOMEONE OR SOMETHING
TO SIGN A BILL OUTSIDE OF THE PRESIDENT’S
PRESENCE
TERRY L. TURNIPSEED*

We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way …1
ABSTRACT
On May 26, 2011, only hours before three provisions of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act were scheduled to expire, Congress passed an
extension. For days, the White House had someone ready to fly to Europe
with the legislation in hand for the President to sign, but Congress had been
tardy. It seemed quite important to the White House that none of these
provisions lapse for any length of time, even the relatively short time it
would take to fly from Washington to France. With this urgency as a
backdrop, the President was awakened at 5:45 a.m. Central European Time
so he could authorize a first: phone a White House staffer in Washington,
D.C., and instruct him to use an autopen to sign the bill. No President had
ever had anyone else sign on his behalf, and certainly no President had ever
ordered the use of an autopen to inscribe his signature on a bill when away
from the White House.
This Article explores multiple facets of the President’s use of a proxy
signature to sign legislation.
The state of the law surrounding proxy signatures has remained
amazingly constant through both English and American history. The proxy
and the principal must be present together when a proxy signature is utilized
*
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1
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (Holmes, J.).

for a high-value transaction.
constitution was written.

This was the rock-solid law when the

No one seems focused on the presence requirement: not the President, nor
the Republican House members who complained to the President, nor the
numerous legal commentators and scholars that we have heard from since
the autopen signing occurred. The use of the autopen, itself unproblematic,
seems to have eclipsed the more important issue of whether the president
was present when it was used.
By definition, if a non-presence proxy signature is affixed to a bill, then
time is of the essence. When time is of the essence, the consequences of a
voided signature are never greater. Since the President has roughly twelve
days to sign a bill, a non-presence proxy signature could produce one of two
unintended consequences. At best, it would produce a twelve-day period
during which the new legislation would not be in effect. At worst, if
Congress is not in session at the end of the twelve-day period, it would
amount to a pocket veto. Neither case is consistent with well-ordered
government.
In sum, the President’s use of the autopen (or even a human being) to sign
a bill outside of the President’s presence is unconstitutional. This
establishes a dangerous precedent, one which every thinking lawyer in
Washington politics seemed to have overlooked. Let the autopen episode
not be a precedent for this or any other President to follow. The Constitution
does not allow for shortcuts.
INTRODUCTION
On May 26, 2011, only hours before three provisions of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) were scheduled to expire, Congress
passed an extension.2 For days, the White House had someone ready to fly
to Europe with the legislation in hand for the President to sign, but Congress
had been tardy.3 It seemed quite important to the White House that none of
these provisions lapse for any length of time, even the relatively short time it
would take to fly from Washington to France.4 With this urgency as a
backdrop, the President was awakened at 5:45 a.m. Central European Time
so he could authorize a first: phone a White House staffer in Washington,
D.C., and instruct him to use an autopen to sign the bill. No President had
ever had anyone else sign on his behalf, and certainly no President had ever

2

S. 990, The Patriot Sunsets Extensions Act of 2011.
Obama Uses Autopen to Sign the Patriot Act Extension, New York Times (May 27,
2011) [hereinafter New York Times].
4
It is not clear to the author why this is so since all three expiring FISA provisions had
grandfathering language anticipation a lapse that provided for the continuation of the
applicability of the provisions to ongoing investigations during any lapse. This is
discussed in more detail in Part IV of this Article.
3

ordered the use of an autopen5 to inscribe his signature on a bill when away
from the White House. The use of the autopen was quite a radical departure
from the norm.
This Article explores multiple facets of the President’s use of a proxy
signature to sign legislation. In particular, the house-of-cards 2005 Office of
Legal Counsel’s memorandum to President George W. Bush making the
legal case for the use of a non-presence proxy to sign bills (the “Nielson
Memorandum”)6 will be critiqued. It is worth noting that despite this
opinion President Bush never utilized a proxy to sign a bill.7 In 2005, in
fact, President Bush flew through the night to get to the White House in time
to sign the Terri Schiavo bill.8 This practice continued into President
Obama’s tenure, including a December 2010 hurried flight by a White
House staffer to Hawaii, where the President was vacationing, to obtain the
President’s in-person signature on the September 11th responders bill.9
The use of the autopen to sign a bill into law brought swift criticism from
21 House members in the form of a strongly-worded letter to the President
that reiterated the multiple dissenting opinions detailed in the Nielson
Memorandum.10 It has also produced some good-natured humor.11
5

Mechanical handwriting reproduction devices are nothing new. Indeed just such a
device was patented in 1803, with Thomas Jefferson using one (and improving it).
Jefferson researched and wrote letters in what has been called the earliest modern office.
Jefferson's Cabinet had a revolving bookstand, table, and chair. Here Jefferson used a
copying machine to make duplicate sets of his letters. Drudging at the Writing Table,
The Jefferson Monticello (Aug. 8, 2011),
http://www.monticello.org/site/jefferson/drudging-writing-table.
6
Memorandum from Howard C. Nielson, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel, Re: Whether the President May Sign a Bill by Directing That His
Signature be Affixed to It (July 7, 2005) [hereinafter Nielson Memorandum].
7
New York Times, supra note 3. George W. Bush thought about a test case – using the
autopen to sign a minor bill into law – “but in the end Bush just kept signing the
parchment himself” said Ari Fleischer, the former White House press secretary. White
House Remains Mum on Use of Autopen to Sign Legislation, Associated Press (June 26,
2011) (http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/06/26/white-house-remains-mum-on-useautopen-to-sign-legislation/#ixzz1Re1N968S).
8
New York Times, supra note 3.
9
Id.
10
Some of the text of this letter follows. The remainder of the letter – Nielson
Memorandum cites that quote prior dissenting opinions – is detailed in Part III.
Mr. President:
On May 26, 2011, the United States Senate and House of
Representatives passed S. 990, the “PATRIOT Sunsets Extensions
Act of 2011.” Shortly before midnight, the White House press
secretary released a statement that you signed the bill into law.
However, your Administration later confirmed that you authorized
the use of an autopen to sign S. 990. Mr. President, your use of the
autopen appears contrary to the Constitution.

Article I, section 7 of the United States Constitution states:
"Every bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it
becomes a Law, be presented to the President of
the United States; If he approve he shall sign it,
but if not he shall return it ... "
On May 27, 2011, Congressman Tom Graves wrote you to request an
explanation for your Constitutional authority to assign a surrogate the
responsibility of signing bills passed by Congress into law. As of
today, Congressman Graves has yet to receive a response from the
White House.
While the July 7, 2005, opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) to President George W. Bush on using a surrogate to sign bills
into law was apparently the basis for your decision, we are compelled
to point out that the memorandum provides a long list of dissenting
opinions. On pages 25-26, the OLC memorandum cites the
following: [these cites are presented in Part III, infra]
Despite the 2005 opinion of the OLC, neither President George W.
Bush nor any of your predecessors assigned a surrogate, or autopen,
to sign a bill into law.
Mr. President, it is clear that assigning a surrogate the responsibility
of signing bills passed by Congress is a debatable issue, and could be
challenged in court. That being the case, our request is that, out of an
abundance of caution, you affix your signature to S. 990 by
personally re-signing the enrolled bill. We recall you retaking the
Oath of Office on January 21, 2009, over similar concerns for
adhering to the Constitution, and believe your signing legislation
passed by the United States Congress is of equal importance.
Furthermore, we ask that you commit to ending the practice of using
an auto pen to sign bills passed by Congress.
Thank you for your consideration of this matter. We look forward to
your response.
June 17, 2011
Available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/AutopenLetter061711a.pdf?tag=contentMain;conte
ntBody [hereinafter House Letter].
Note that the letter calls for President Obama to sign the legislation now. Of course this
would have no effect since the bill is already a law due to the passage of the ten-day
period (excluding Sundays), with that period ending at a time when Congress was in
session. There was, however, a twelve-day period when neither the old FISA provisions
nor the renewed provisions were in force. See infra Part IV.
11
See, e.g., Republicans Urge Autopen to Consider Presidential Campaign, The
Huffington Post (May 28, 2011) (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ben-ritz/obamaautopen-_b_868371.html):

In Part I, this Article details the constitutional underpinnings of the
Presidential signature requirement. Part II of this Article discusses the
origins of proxy signatures, and in particular the associated presence
requirement for proxy signatures. The origins date back to the Statute of
Frauds and then the Statute of Wills. As the starting point for analysis of
proxy signatures generally, the longstanding and extensive body of law
associated with proxy signatures for wills is the most important lens to view
the requirements for Presidential proxy signatures. Part II, then, explores in
detail the law of will proxy signatures that forms the bedrock of interpreting
the Article I §7 Presidential signature requirement. Part III critiques the
Nielson Memorandum’s treatment of the presence requirement for proxy
signatures. This critique includes a look at the Nielson Memorandum’s cites
to the lessons of will executions that require the proxy to be present, though
the memorandum ignores these same lessons in a shoddy attempt to explain
away the presence requirement in a footnote. Part IV examines potential
negative consequences that could flow from a void Presidential signature on
a bill. Finally, Part V concludes.

The recent focus on the Autopen now has Republicans developing a
new game plan for the 2012 election. With their field of viable
prospective presidential candidates rapidly shrinking, many
Republican insiders have quietly begun urging the Autopen to mount
a bid for the GOP Presidential nomination to unseat President
Obama. Despite having never itself served as an elected
representative, the autopen has worked under nearly every politician
in the United States since 1946, signing countless letters to
constituents and prospective political supporters. The Autopen, they
say, is uniquely qualified to run a strong campaign and already has a
leg up on a majority of the declared contenders.
"Mr. Pen already has more experience in government than Herman
Cain, who himself is inexplicably polling at 8 percent of Republican
primary voters," said conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer.
"Unlike Newt Gingrich, it doesn't have problems keeping its message
consistent, and although it may not have the people skills that Mr.
Obama possesses, its charisma far exceeds that of Tim Pawlenty."
"The Autopen is the best serious candidate we can come up with now
that both Governors Chris Christie and Mitch Daniels have declined
to run," says a Republican National Committee member who asked to
speak off the record. He observed that the Autopen has quickly
gained support among establishment Republican officials afraid that
the renewed prospect of a Palin run could sink their chances of
retaking the White House. "The fact is, Governor Palin just doesn't
have the intellectual curiosity that the Autopen possesses. Most of us
have personally worked with both Ms. Palin and the Autopen and we
all believe that when it comes time to make the hard decisions and
answer the tough questions, Sarah Palin cannot match the Autopen's
skills.”

In sum, the President’s use of the autopen (or even a human being) to sign
a bill outside of the President’s presence is unconstitutional.12 This
establishes a dangerous precedent, one which every thinking lawyer in
Washington politics seemed to have overlooked.
I. The Constitution
The Supreme Court has not extensively considered the fundamental
significance of the President’s signature under Article 1, §7 clause 2.13 It is
hard to believe that, after more than two hundred years of constitutional
construction, an act so essential to one of the most routine functions of
government, lawmaking, has escaped the scrutiny of the federal courts. This
is, perhaps, because it has long been taken for granted that the President’s
signature is more than a perfunctory mark of approval. As discussed in the
introduction above, President Obama’s use of the autopen to renew three
provisions of FISA in absentia is without precedent in American history.
But it is not the President’s use of the autopen that is problematic. Rather,
the President’s absence during the proxy signing is, and it demands an
examination of the very nature of the Constitution’s signature requirement.
Art. I, §7, cl. 2 reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a
Law, be presented to the President of the United States: If
he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with
his Objections to that House in which it shall have
originated . . . If after such Reconsideration two thirds of
that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent,
together with the Objections, to the other House, by which
it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two
thirds of that House, it shall become a Law . . . If any Bill
shall not be returned by the President within ten Days
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to

12

Of course, just as in the analogous large body of statutory and case law for wills, the
President could have a proxy sign a bill while in the President’s presence. Otherwise, for
example, we could not have a functional physically-challenged President who was unable
to sign. Also in accord with the law of the execution of wills, the President need not have
a physical challenge in order to utilize a proxy who signs in his or her presence.
13
It has, however, ruled on the timeliness of the President’s signature (La Abra Silver
Mining Case Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899) (under Art. 1, §7 the President
may sign a bill into law during a Congressional recess); Edwards v. United States, 286
U.S. 482 (1932) (under Art., 1 §7 the President may sign a bill into law after the final
adjournment of the Congress that passed and presented it)) and on the legal effect of the
President’s signature with respect to the line item veto (Clinton v. City of New York, 524
U.S. 417 (1998) (Line Item Veto Act violated the presentment clause of Art. 1, §7 and the
separation of powers)).

him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had
signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment
prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.
It thus establishes three means by which a bill can become a law: (1) by the
signature of the President; (2) by supermajority, and; (3) by the lapse of ten
days (excluding Sundays) from presentment (assuming Congress is in
session for the period), absent a veto and absent the signature of the
President.14
The debates on the Constitution provide indispensable guidance on the
principles informing the signature requirement.15 Alexander Hamilton
himself noted, “There is hardly any part of the system which could have
been attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement of [the
Constitution] than [the Executive]”.16 The Supreme Court recently agreed,
noting,
[t]he procedures governing the enactment of statutes set
forth in the text of Article I were the product of the great
debates and compromises that produced the Constitution
itself. Familiar historical materials provide abundant
support for the conclusion that the power to enact statutes
may only be exercised in accord with a single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.17
14

John Quincy Adams explained that these three alternative methods of lawmaking were
a product of the unique American constitutional system. Unlike Great Britain, where the
institution of King-in-Parliament is alone competent to make laws, in the United States,
“the principles [a]re different. . . . [T]he President is not a constituent part of Congress,
and an Act of Congress may be valid as law without his signature or assent.” MEMOIRS
OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS (1875), vol. 6, p. 279. The framers explicitly rejected the model
of King-in-Parliament, and with it a chief magistrate who would be, in Hamilton’s words,
“a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic it
would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish the intended and necessary
responsibility of the chief magistrate himself.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 at 346 (Terence
Ball ed., 2006). In the American republic, a more vigorous presidency would be
necessary.
15
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of the debates on constitutional
interpretation. See e.g. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 570-71 (1840):
In expounding the Constitution of the United States, every word must
have its due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the
whole instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly
added. The many discussions which have taken place upon the
construction of the Constitution, have proved the correctness of this
proposition; and shown the high talent, the caution, and the foresight
of the illustrious men who framed it. Every word appears to have
been weighed with the utmost deliberation, and its force and effect to
have been fully understood.
16
THE FEDERALIST No. 67, at 327 (Terence Ball ed., 2006).
17
Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. at 439-40.

The original lawmaking procedure considered by the Constitutional
Convention contained no signature requirement at all. But then again, it also
18
envisioned a decidedly weak Executive.
The Randolph Propositions,
which were the starting point for the Constitutional Convention,19 vested the
power to make law in Congress, but conferred a veto power on a Council of
Revision composed of the Executive (not yet defined as a unitary institution)
“and a convenient number of the National Judiciary”.20 But as successive
drafts of the Constitution circulated, the signature requirement emerged in
close connection with the development of the separation of powers doctrine.
As James Madison explained to Convention delegates,
If it be essential to the preservation of liberty that the
Legisl[ative,] Execut[ive,] and Judiciary powers be
separate, it is essential to a maintenance of the separation
that they should be made independent of each other. The
Executive could not be independent of the Legislature, if
dependent on the pleasure of that branch for a
reappointment. . . In like manner a dependence of the
Executive on the Legislature, would render it the Executor
as well as the maker of laws; & then according to the
observation of Montesquieu, tyrannical laws may be made
that they may be executed in a tyrannical manner. . . . .
Experience had proved a tendency in our [state]
governments to throw all power into the Legislative vortex.
The Executives of the States are in general little more than
Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent.21
As the Convention began to debate an affirmative role for the Executive
in the legislative process, a role that would make it more than a mere cypher
of the Legislature, two versions of what would become Art. I, §7 circulated
18

Of the original thirteen states, only Maryland's constitution required the Governor's
signature in the legislative process. Even so, the Governor was required to sign a bill
only after it had effectively passed into law. He had no veto power, and thus lacked the
discretion to refuse to sign.
Constitution of Maryland (1776) available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ma02.asp (“Art. LX. That every bill passed by
the General Assembly, when engrossed, shall be presented by the Speaker of the House
of Delegates, in the Senate, to the Governor for the time being, who shall sign the same,
and thereto affix the Great Seal, in the presence of the members of both Houses: every
law shall be recorded in the General Court office of the western shore, and in due time
printed, published, and certified under the Great Seal, to the several County Courts, in the
same manner as hath been heretofore used in this State.”)
19
Also known as the Virginia Plan, the Propositions were authored by James Madison
and presented by Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia, who memorably referred to a
strong unitary Executive as “the foetus of monarchy.” NOTES ON DEBATES IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 46 (1987).
20
NOTES ON DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES
MADISON 32 (1987).
21
Id. at 311-12.

among the delegates. The first, put forward for consideration on August 6th
1786, stipulated:
Every bill, which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a
law, be presented to the President of the United States for
his revision: if, upon such revision, he approve of it, he
shall signify his approbation by signing it: But if, upon
such revision, it shall appear to him improper for being
passed into a law, he shall return it, together with his
objections against it, to that House in which it shall have
originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their
journal and proceed to reconsider that bill. . .22
The second proposal, which Madison put before the Convention on August
15th, stipulated:
Every bill which shall have passed the two houses, shall,
before it become a law, be severally presented to the
President of the United States, and to the judges of the
supreme court for the revision of each. If, upon such
revision, they shall approve of it, they shall respectively
signify their approbation by signing it; but if, upon such
revision, it shall appear improper to either, or both, to be
passed into a law, it shall be returned, with the objections
against it, to that house, in which it shall have originated. .
.23
Although the composition of the executive is different in each draft, early
formulations of the presentment and signature requirements of Art. I, §7
appear in each. Moreover, the signature requirements in each draft share a
common purpose: the President’s signature is to serve as a formal act
signifying the approval of the Executive.
The signature requirement can also be understood as a safeguard against
the abuse of executive power. As James Iredell, leader of the North Carolina
Federalists and future justice of the Supreme Court, explained, “the
President must be personally responsible for every thing (emphasis in
original).”24 A necessary means of ensuring such accountability was that all
important advice and decisions be reduced to writing.25 Iredell’s discussion
22

Id. at 388-89.
Id. at 462.
24
James Iredell, Answers to Mason’s “Objections” in I THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION (Bernard Bailyn ed., 377) (1990). Iredell was by no means alone in
holding this view of the presidency. (See e.g. Tench Coxe, An American Citizen, in id.,
23 (“the people have a strong hold upon [the President] from his sole and personal
responsibility (emphasis in original.”).
25
Iredell, Answers to Mason’s “Objections”, at 376.
23

of the role of the President’s advisors is particularly illuminating in this
respect:
[The President] is not to be assisted by a Council,
summoned to a jovial dinner perhaps, and giving their
opinions according to the nod of the President—but the
opinion is to be given with the utmost solemnity, in writing.
No after equivocation can explain it away. It must for ever
after speak for itself, and commit the character of the
writer, in lasting colours either of fame or infamy, or
neutral significance, to future ages, as well as the present
(emphasis in original).
Note that the writing requirement has two attributes: first, it must be public,
and second, the writing is imputed to the writer himself. In this manner,
Iredell explained, “the President who acts should be responsible for his
conduct, following advice at his peril, than that there should be a danger of
punishing any man for an erroneous opinion which might possibly be sincere
(emphasis in original).”26
Both the Constitution as ratified and its early drafts treat the acts of
approval and signature as separate and distinct from one another. However,
for a bill to become law by approval of the President, the President’s
signature is essential. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction in La
Abra when it explained,
It has properly been the practice of the President to inform
Congress by message of his approval of bills, so that the
fact may be recorded. But the essential thing to be done in
order that a bill may become law by the approval of the
President is that it be signed within the prescribed time
after being presented to him.27
If Presidential approval alone were enough to turn a bill into a law, it would
be sufficient for the President to inform Congress of his consent for the
record. The President’s signature alone authoritatively communicates his
approbation. Thus it is only by signing a bill that the President can turn it
into a law.28
26

Id. at 377.
La Abra, at 454.
28
Lawmaking by approval of the President is to be distinguished from lawmaking absent
the President’s veto. (See the third means by which a bill become law described in Part I
above.) The Art. 1, §7 provision that “If any Bill shall not be returned by the President
within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same
shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it,” is not so much a prescription for
lawmaking as an explanation of the legal effect the failure of the President to take action.
As one scholar put it, “[t]he Constitution presents the President with two basic choices: to
sign or veto a bill. While the Constitution does mention the possibility of the President
27

Since it is the President’s signature, and not his mere approval, that gives
a bill the force of law, it is puzzling that the Nielson Memorandum and a
29
2011 Office of Legal Counsel memorandum on electronic presentment
characterize the act of signature as a ministerial function on the part of the
President. The Supreme Court has explained, “[a] ministerial duty. . . is one
in respect to which nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple, definite duty,
arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law.”30
The President’s duty of signature is indeed imposed by law – by the
Constitution of the United States, no less – but it cannot possibly be
characterized as a duty that leaves nothing to discretion. While the
President’s approbation of a bill and his signature thereof are separate acts,
only the President’s signature gives effect to his approbation. Not just any
expression of approbation will do when it comes to the enactment by the
President of a law.31 Thus the Cedarbaum Memorandum was only half
correct in noting that signature “is an external manifestation of internal
assent, and Article I, Section 7 plainly requires the outward manifestation in
addition to the internal assent when it states: ‘If [the President] approve [a
bill] he shall sign it.’”32 But as La Abra established, because the President’s
approbation is meaningless absent his signature, it is not quite so easy to
separate the discretionary from ministerial elements from the act of signing a
bill.
This may, of course, be why over the course of more than two hundred
years, at no time has a proxy signature been utilized to sign a bill into law
until President Obama attempted to do so in May 2011.
II. The Presence Requirement for Proxy Signatures
The presence requirement for proxy signatures first appears in the Statute
of Frauds of 1677, whose purpose was the “prevention of many fraudulent
Practices which are commonly endeavoured to be upheld by Perjury and
Subornation of Perjury”. The exact text is as follows (spelling modernized):

not signing a bill, it does so not to give the President an opportunity to avoid taking
responsibility for a bill, but instead to specify the legal effects of the President failing,
due to oversight or intention, to exercise his powers under the Constitution.” Michael B.
Rappaport, The Unconstitutionality of “Signing and Not-Enforcing”, 16 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 122 (2007), 123 n. 33. Assuming the unconstitutionality of President
Obama’s absentee signature by proxy of the extension of the three provisions of the FISA
Act, the extension will nevertheless have become valid law under this third approach to
lawmaking.
29
Whether Bills May be Presented by Congress and Returned by the President by
Electronic Means, Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President from Jonathan
G. Cedarbaum, p.2 (May 3, 2011) [hereinafter Cedarbaum Memorandum].
30
Mississippi v. Johnson, 17 U.S. 475, 498 (1867).
31
See La Abra, note 13.
32
Cedarbaum Memorandum, at 9.

And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid That
from and after the said four and twentieth day of June all
Devises and Bequests of any Lands or Tenements
deviseable either by force of the Statute of Wills or by this
Statute or by force of the Custom of Kent of the Customs if
any Burrough or any other particular Custom shall be in
Writing and signed by the party so devising the same or by
some other person in his presence (emphasis added) and by
his express directions and shall be attested and subscribed
in the presence of the said Devisor by three or four credible
Witnesses or else they shall be utterly void and of none
effect.33
The Wills Act of 1837 added to the requirements for the execution of wills:
No will shall be valid unless—
(a) it is in writing, and signed by the testator, or
by some other person in his presence
(emphasis added) and by his direction; and
(b) it appears that the testator intended by his
signature to give effect to the will; and
(c) the signature is made or acknowledged by the
testator in the presence of two or more
witnesses present at the same time; and
(d) each witness either –
(i)

attests and signs the will; or

(ii)

acknowledges his signature, in
the presence of the testator (but
not necessarily in the presence of
any other witness),

but no form of attestation shall be necessary.34

33

29 Car. 2, c. 3. § 5.
1 Vict. c. 26 §9 (available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Will4and1Vict/7/26/section/9).
34

This very large, very developed and time-honored body of law – the law of
wills – is the appropriate lens in which to view the requirements for a valid
proxy signature. The Nielson Memorandum recognizes this implicitly in its
heavy reliance on the law of wills to legitimize proxy signatures.
This presence requirement for proxy signatures endures to modern times.
The Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”) § 2-502, for example, requires the
following:
(a) [An attested] will must be:
(1) in writing;
(2) signed by the testator or in the testator's name
by some other individual in the testator's conscious
presence (emphasis added) and by the testator's
direction; and
(3) signed by at least two individuals, each of
whom signed within a reasonable time after he [or
she] witnessed either the signing of the will as
described in paragraph (2) or the testator's
acknowledgment of that signature or
acknowledgment of the will.35
Oddly, all the cases cited in the comment to UPC § 2-502 concern the
presence of witnesses to the signature of the will and not the presence of the
testator herself when someone signs on her behalf at her instruction.36 The
35

Uniform Probate Code § 2-502(a)(2); see also 79 Am. Jur. 2d Wills § 215; see e.g., In
re Estate of Sky Dancer, 13 P.3d 1231 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000); Matter of Guardianship
and Conservatorship of Slemp, 11 Kan. App. 2d 156, 717 P.2d 519 (1986).
36
The comment to UPC § 2-502 explains:
Under subsection (a)(2), the testator must sign the will or some other
individual must sign the testator's name in the testator’s presence and
by the testator's direction. If the latter procedure is followed, and
someone else signs the testator's name, the so-called “conscious
presence” test is codified, under which a signing is sufficient if it was
done in the testator's conscious presence, i.e., within the range of the
testator’s senses such as hearing; the signing need not have occurred
within the testator's line of sight. For application of the “consciouspresence” test, see Cunningham v. Cunningham, 80 Minn. 180, 83
N.W. 58 (1900) (conscious-presence requirement held satisfied
where “the signing was within the sound of the testator's voice; he
knew what was being done . . .”); Healy v. Bartless, 73 N.H. 110, 59
A. 617 (1904) (individuals are in the decedent's conscious presence
“whenever they are so near at hand that he is conscious of where they

presence requirement for a proxy signature is so unequivocally accepted in
the law of wills37 that it is not litigated very much. This is borne out by the
scarcity of case law. Nevertheless, the test for the presence requirement
(“conscious presence”) is the same for each, so looking at the purpose of the
presence requirement for witnesses is instructive. For example, one court
explained the purpose of the presence requirement (as far as witnesses are
concerned) as follows: “The object of the provision of the statute that the
witnesses shall sign in the presence of the testator, is to prevent substitution
and fraud upon him.”38
The Restatement also requires the presence of the proxy.
n. Signature by another. The testator need not sign the will
himself or herself. The statutes allow someone else to sign
the testator's name for the testator, if the testator directed
the other person to sign the testator’s name and if the other
person acted in the testator’s presence. In determining
whether the person signed in the testator’s presence, this
Restatement adopts and the UPC codifies the consciouspresence test and rejects the line-of-vision test (see
Comment p).39
An example of the proxy presence requirement appears in a leading wills
law textbook:
Arthur spent weeks drafting a complicated will for Maria,
are and of what they are doing, through any of his senses, and where
he can readily see them if he is so disposed.”); Demaris’ Estate, 166
Or. 36, 110 P.2d 571 (1941) (“[W]e do not believe that sight is the
only test of presence. We are convinced that any of the senses that a
testator possesses, which enable him to know whether another is near
at hand and what he is doing, may be employed by him in
determining whether [an individual is] in his [conscious] presence . . .
“).
37
In Miller v. Miller, 96 Miss. 526 (1910), the Supreme Court of Mississippi had to
consider whether a will executed by an illiterate man was valid. The testator had
someone else write the will. The testator then had a witness read the document to him
and sign the testator’s name to it. The issue before the court, however, was not whether
the proxy’s signature was valid in light of the testator’s inability to read the will, but
rather whether the witnesses’ signatures were valid. That is, the court took it as a given
that even an illiterate could authorize a proxy’s signature as long as that proxy was in the
presence of the testator. See also Sheehan v. Kearney, 82 Miss. 688 (1903) (“Any
signature or mark signed by the testator, or by another in his presence and at his express
direction, to the will, as and for his completed signature, and acknowledged and adopted
by him as such at the time, in the presence of the subscribing witnesses, is a sufficient
signing”).
38
Mandeville v. Parker, 31 NJ Eq. 242, 252 (1879). For a lengthy discussion of
“conscious presence” see also Dubach v. Jolly, 279 Ill. 530 (1917).
39
Restatement, Third, of Property (Wills and Other Donative Transfers) § 3.1, comm. n
(1998).

one of his most wealthy and influential clients. Arthur
received a telephone call from Maria while she was in
flight to Europe. She explained she was running behind
schedule and was not able to make it to Arthur’s office to
sign the will as she had planned. She then stated, “I hereby
direct you to sign my will for me.” Arthur complied. Is
Maria’s will valid?
Explanation. Courts typically hold that the testator need
not actually see the proxy make the signature. Instead, the
testator must be in a position where the testator could see or
make use of the testator’s other senses [if, for example the
testator were blind] to determine what is happening.
Maria’s will is unlikely to be valid because Maria could not
see or use her other senses to determine whether Arthur
actually signed the appropriate document.40
The overarching aim of statutes governing the formal requirements of will
execution was stated well in a New York case: “The formalities prescribed
by the statute are safeguards thrown around the testator to prevent fraud and
imposition.”41 Thus the challenges one sees to wills signed by proxy are not
rooted in arguments about the formal signing requirements but in arguments
of fraud and undue influence.42
Avoidance of fraud, then, is consistently fixed as the purpose of the
presence requirement, something that should be of the utmost importance in
Presidential proxy signatures of bills into laws. Born of fraud prevention,
this entire body of law has been consistent in its presence requirement, and
was very well established at the time of the Constitution’s ratification and
beyond.

40
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Wills, Trusts, and Estates, Gerry W. Beyer, 87 (4 ed. 2007).
In re Mackay’s Will, 110 NY 611, 615 (1888). This language was also quoted in In re
Will of Heaney, 347 NYS 2d 922, 923 (1973).
42
One example of this is an Oregon case that held a proxy’s signature of a blind man’s
will in the presence of the blind testator was valid. In re Pickett’s Will, 49 Ore. 127
(1907). The court applied the Oregon statute establishing a presence requirement for the
proxy, holding that the formal requirements of the statute were met. It further noted that
the court had every reason to believe from the evidence presented that the testator was of
sound mind at the time the will was signed. In fact, the will was challenged not because
the claimants thought it could not be executed through the use of a proxy, but because
they believed the proxy wielded undue influence over the testator.
41

III. The Nielson Memorandum and the Presence Requirement
The Nielson Memorandum describes multiple prior legal opinions
indicating that the President could not use a non-presence proxy to sign
legislation. The following, taken from the House Letter, summarize these
prior opinions:
• “See Rehnquist Letter at 2 (concluding that ‘with the
exception of signing bills passed by Congress, there is no
legal impediment to the delegation of the act of signing and
that the question of which documents the President should
personally sign is largely one of propriety rather than of
law’) (emphasis added)”
• “Scalia Memorandum at 1 (citing Rehnquist
Memorandum and stating that ‘[t]he signing of bills passed
by the Congress is one exception which may require the
President's personal signature’) (emphasis added)”
• “Memorandum to Files from Ralph W. Tarr, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re:
Presidential Signing of Bankruptcy Extension Act at 9-10
(June 13, 1984) (‘Tarr Memorandum’) (‘We therefore
concluded that it was necessary for the President physically
to sign the bill in order for it to become a law.’)”
• “Wilkey Memorandum at 10 (‘a bill would seem to
present an a fortiori case in which under the Constitutional
provision the signification of the President's approval
requires an exercise of personal discretion and therefore
cannot be delegated’)”
• “Rehnquist Memorandum at 2 (‘the requirement for the
President’s signature as well as his decision approving a
bill would appear to be non-delegable’)”
• “Indeed, on at least two occasions, a bill was flown
halfway around the world, on the advice of this Office, so
that the President could personally affix his signature to it.
See Tarr Memorandum at 9 (China) see also Memorandum
to File from Jeffrey P. Singdahlsen, Attorney-Adviser,
Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Preliminary Advice and
Consideration Regarding Proposal to Fax Continuing
Resolution to the President While He Was Abroad at I
43
(Dec. 22, 1999) (Turkey).”
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House Letter, supra note 10 at 25-26.

So, the Nielson Memorandum ignores the numerous prior executive branch
legal opinions concluding that the President may not have a non-presence
proxy sign legislation.
Incredibly, the Nielson Memorandum concedes that the bulk of prior law
addressing the issue of allowing someone else to sign on behalf of another
emphatically states that the person signing has to be in the presence of the
principal. Indeed, not taking into account footnote 11 (to be discussed
below), the Nielson Memorandum cites twenty-two sources confirming that
presence is required of a proxy signature or seal! Here are the twenty-two
sources:
Even where the law required authorization under seal,
however, the principle of signatures permitted one validly
to sign or seal a document, in the absence of such formal
authorization, by directing another to affix one’s name or
seal to the document in one’s presence. See Ball v.
Dunsterville, 100 Eng. Rep. 1038, 1039, 4 Term Rep. 313,
314 (K.B. 1791) (“The Court were clearly of opinion that
there was no ground for the objection; that no particular
mode of delivery was necessary, for that it was sufficient if
the party, executing a deed, treated it as his own. And they
relied principally on this deed having been executed by one
defendant for himself and the other in the presence of that
other.”); Simonds v. Ludlow, 2 Cai. Cas. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1805) (similar, citing Lord Lovelace’s Case and Ball);
Hanford v. McNair, 9 Wend. 54, 56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832)
(“An agent cannot bind his principal by deed, unless he has
authority by deed so to do. The only exception to the rule
that the authority to execute a deed must be by deed, is
where the agent or attorney affixes the seal of the principal
in his presence and by his direction.”); Rex v. Longnor, 110
Eng. Rep. 599, 600, 4 B. & A. 647, 649 (K.B. 1833)
(Littledale, J.) (upholding the validity of a deed where two
principals “met for the purpose of executing it, [and] their
names, by their authority, were written opposite to two of
the seals”); cf. Mackay v. Bloodgood, 9 Johns. 285 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1812) (“In the present case, one of the defendants
sealed the bond, with one seal, for himself and his partner,
with the consent of his partner, and after the partner had
seen and approved of the bond, and while he was about the
store, at the time of the execution. This evidence was
sufficient to carry the cause to the jury, and to justify them
44
in finding it the deed of both.”);
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Nielson Memorandum at 9.

Courts based this rule on the general principle that “what a
person does in the presence of another, in his name and by
his direction, is the act of the latter, as if done exclusively
in his own person.” Kime v. Brooks, 31 N.C. 218, 220
(1848); see also Kidder v. Prescott, 24 N.H. 263 (1851)
(“an act done by one in the presence and under the control
of another, for that other, is regarded not as the exercise of
a delegated authority, but as the personal act of the party in
whose behalf it was performed”); Gardner v. Gardner, 59
Mass. 483, 484 (1850) (“The execution of the deed is
objected to, on the ground, that when a deed is executed by
an agent or attorney, the authority to do so must be an
authority of as high a nature, derived from an instrument
under the seal of the grantor. This is a good rule of law, but
it does not apply to the present case. The name being
written by another hand, in the presence of the grantor, and
45
at her request, is her act.”);
As Justice Story explained,
[A]lthough a person cannot ordinarily sign
a deed for and as the agent of another,
without an authority given to him under
seal; yet this is true only in the absence of
the principal; for if the principal is
present, and verbally or impliedly
authorizes the agent to fix his name to the
deed, it becomes the deed of the principal;
and it is deemed, to all intents and
purposes, as binding upon him, as if he
had personally sealed and executed it. The
distinction may seem nice and refined; but
it proceeds upon the ground, that where
the principal is present, the act of signing
and sealing is to be deemed his personal
act, as much as if he held the pen, and
another person guided his hand and
pressed it on the seal.
46

Story on Agency § 51.

A similar principle was expressly incorporated in the
provision of the Statute of Frauds governing wills, which
required that “all devises and bequests of any lands . . .

45
46

Id. at 10.
Id.

shall be in writing, and signed by the party so devising the
same, or by some other person in his presence and by his
express directions, and shall be attested and subscribed in
the presence of the said devisor by 3 or 4 credible
witnesses.” 29 Car. II. c. 3; see also Starr v. Starr, 2 Root
303 (Conn. Super. 1795) (discussing the statutory
47
requirements); Ford v. Ford, 26 Tenn. 92 (1846) (same);
Consistent with the statutory language and the principle of
signatures, courts upheld wills signed in the testator’s name
and presence by another. See, e.g., Cochran’s Will, 6 Ky.
491, 499 (1814) (“The will was written by David Cochran,
in the absence of all other persons except the testator. The
name of the testator was signed by D. Cochran – he proves
that it was done under the direction of the testator. The
subscribing witnesses all prove the acknowledgment of the
testator that this instrument was his will, and in his
presence attested the same. This is a substantial compliance
with the law.”); Pate’s Administrator v. Joe, 26 Ky. 113,
113 (1829) (“That testator’s name was signed by his
directions, and that witnesses subscribed their names in his
presence, may be established by circumstantial
48
evidence.”);
In addition, courts held that attesting witnesses could
satisfy the statutory requirement that they “subscribe their
names” to the will by directing that their signature be
affixed to the will by another in their presence on the
ground that, consistent with the principle of signatures,
such a signing “should . . . , for every purpose
contemplated by the law, be regarded as their own act, as
much so as if it had been a deed to which they were
subscribed, or as if their hands had been held and guided by
49
another.” Upchurch v. Upchurch, 55 Ky. 102, 113 (1855);
Thus, for example, in reliance on the well established rule
that “the name of a party affixed to an instrument by his
direction, and in his presence, is affixed by himself;
whether he in fact puts his hand upon the pen or not,” it
was held in Hanson v. Rowe, 26 N.H. 327 (1853), that
where “[t]he sign of the magistrate was placed upon the
writ, by a mechanical act performed in his presence and
under his immediate direction and inspection,” it was “to
every legal intent as much his sign manual as if his own
47

Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 10 – 11.

hand had guided the pen which traced it.” Id. at 329; see
also Andover v. Grafton, 7 N.H. 298, 305 (1834) (“Had the
selectman who signed the note, placed with his own name
that of the other selectman who authorized him to settle the
account and give a note, perhaps the evidence respecting
the authority might have been sufficient to have rendered it
valid, as it would then have purported to carry on its face
evidence that it was the act of the town, by a majority of the
selectmen; but even in that case it would deserve
consideration, whether authority to do this could be
delegated, and whether it could be legally done unless the
other selectman was present, and assenting at the time of
50
the execution of the paper.”);
And in a somewhat later case, in a context very similar to
that which we consider here, the Supreme Court of the
State of Missouri held that the mayor of Kansas City could
approve an ordinance passed by the city counsel by
directing his secretary to affix the mayor’s signature to the
ordinance in his presence. Porter v. Boyd Paving &
Construction Co., 214 Mo. 1 (1908). The city’s charter
paralleled Article I, Section 7, providing that ordinances
passed by the city counsel “shall be ‘presented to the
mayor. If the mayor approve any ordinance he shall sign it;
if not he shall return it to the city clerk with his objection,
and the city clerk shall at the next session of the house in
51
which it originated return it to such house.’” Id. at 10.;
Indeed, similar principles may have governed the manner
in which the King of England approved bills passed by
Parliament. As Blackstone explains, the King could assent
to a bill either by signing it with his own hand or by
directing the clerk of Parliament to manifest the King’s
assent in the presence of the King and Parliament. See 1
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
52
England *184-85;
For example, in 1824 Attorney General Wirt addressed the
question “[w]hether, in cases in which the law requires that
public documents should be signed by the Secretary of the
Treasury, that officer having been rendered by sickness
unable to write his name in the usual manner, may impress
his name by the use of a stamp or copperplate, instead of
pen and ink; and whether instruments so signed are valid in
50

Id. at 11.
Id.
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Id.
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law.” Signature of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1 Op.
Att’y Gen. 670, 673-74 (1824). “[P]roceed[ing] upon the
postulate that the Secretary has not been so far disabled by
disease but that he is capable of seeing what is done, so that
one paper cannot be passed upon him for another,” id. at
674, Attorney General Wirt concluded:
[I]f [the Secretary] keep the stamp or
copperplate in his own possession, and
either apply it himself, or cause it to be
applied by another in his presence, and by
his authority, I am of opinion that the
instrument is as valid, in strict law, as if he
had written his name with a pen. It might
otherwise happen that the public might
lose the services of an able officer, from a
mere temporary disability in his right
hand.
53

Id. at 673-74;

If he were accustomed to sign his name by a stamp rather
than with pen and ink there can be no question that he
might authorize this stamp to be affixed in his presence by
another person in his behalf.” citing Signing Certificate
Attached to Farm Loan Bonds, 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 146, 14754
148 (1917).
These citations, contained in the Nielson Memorandum itself,
unambiguously make the case that presence is required for a proxy
signature.
This brings us to the Achilles’ heel of the Nielson Memorandum, which
the Office of Legal Counsel conveniently buries in a footnote.55 Footnote 11
concedes this Article’s main point straight away: “[T]he principle of
signatures generally required the principal’s presence for his signature
validly to be affixed to a document by another person otherwise lacking
authority to act on the principal’s behalf …”56 Notwithstanding this accurate
statement of the law, footnote 11 states a “belief” wholly incommensurate
with the law:
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Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
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Nielson Memorandum at 20, fn 11. As my Constitutional Law I Professor Roy A.
Schotland used to say while slamming his fist to the table after one of his students failed
to know the answer to a question: “Dammit! Always read the footnotes: that’s where the
good stuff is hiding!”
56
Id.
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we do not believe that [the] inability of the President to
delegate the decision whether to approve and sign a bill
means that his presence is required when his signature is
affixed to a bill he has approved and decided to sign, so
long as the person affixing the President’s signature to the
bill has been properly and specifically authorized to
perform that ministerial act.57
Footnote 11 then attempts to justify the abandonment of the centuries-old
presence requirement, claiming,: “The purpose of the presence requirement
appears to have been to provide a principal with control over acts done in his
name in the absence of some other valid grant of authority that would
otherwise constrain his agent.”58 (This is inaccurate, of course. As this
Article has clearly demonstrated, the purpose of the presence requirement is
the prevention of fraud and undue influence.) The Nielson Memorandum
then cherry-picks an 1848 North Carolina case in support of this proposition.
See, e.g., Kime v. Brooks, 31 N.C. 218, 220 (1848) (“what a
person does in the presence of another, in his name and by
his direction, is the act of the latter, as if done exclusively
in his own person; but that what is done out of his presence,
though by his direction and in his name, cannot in law be
considered an act in propria persona,59 but one done by
authority”); id. at 221 (agent’s act of signing, sealing, and
delivering of deed was not in principal’s physical presence
and could not be said to be the principal’s act ‘in that he
saw or knew or could know of his own knowledge, that [the
agent] was in fact doing what he directed her; but it rested
on his confidence, that she would pursue his directions, and
in her testimony that she did pursue them’).
This language barely supports the memorandum’s argument, much less
undermines the applicability of the presence requirement. The citation does
little more than offer a crude distinction between a proxy and an agent.
Footnote 11 then states:
That requirement should not apply, however, when a
principal properly and specifically authorizes a subordinate
to affix the principal’s signature to a document.
Accordingly, as noted above, the Department has properly
substituted specific authorization for presence in situations
where an executive officer retains the decision-making
function associated with a signature requirement but directs
57

Id.
Id.
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“In one’s own person.” Black’s Law dictionary (9 ed. 2009).
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another to perform the manual act of affixing the officer’s
signature.60
This bold statement runs counter to logic and counter to the body of law
that has existed since the Statute of Frauds first defined a category of highvalue transactions, including the execution of wills, that would be protected
from fraud by formal legal requirements. (The Nielson Memorandum uses
six cites to the law of wills to support its contention that proxy signatures are
allowed for Presidential signatures of legislation. Footnote 11 then ignores
this body of law completely.) “Specific authorization” cannot substitute for
presence. Fraud in the execution of documents can too easily occur without
the presence of the principal. This requirement must be maintained for highvalue transactions both as a matter of policy and as a matter of constitutional
interpretation. As to the latter, the presence requirement was firmly in place
both at common law and in statutes at the time that Article I was drafted and
ratified.
As further justification for the argument that presence is not required,
footnote 11 cites as follows: “See, e.g., Signing Certificate Attached to Farm
Loan Bonds, 31 Op. Att’y Gen. at 147-48; Affixing Facsimile Signatures to
Orders, 31 Op. Att’y Gen. at 351; Wheat Memorandum at 9; Rankin
Memorandum at 2-3.”61 In sum, then, the Nielson Memorandum rests its
entire argument on two Attorney General opinions, one unpublished
memorandum of the Office of the Solicitor General, and one unpublished
memorandum of the Office of Legal Counsel. The subjects of these
opinions are signatures on certificates relating to farm loan bonds, signatures
on military orders, signatures for the appointment of Postmasters (the subject
of the Wheat Memorandum), and signatures for the appointment of Marshals
(the subject of the Rankin Memorandum). None of the signatures discussed
in these memoranda require a Presidential signature that is constitutionally
mandated. The memoranda dealing with them are self-serving executive
branch opinions citing no case law and positing no constitutional
interpretations that would be relevant to a constitutionally-mandated
Presidential signature. The Nielson Memorandum is perhaps the most selfserving of them all, as it gives shabby treatment to one of the highest-value
transactions entrusted to the Executive: lawmaking itself. Footnote 11 is but
a flimsy two of clubs card that is attempting to hold up the rest of the deck.62
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Nielson Memorandum at 20, fn 11.
Id.
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Note finally that the Nielson Memorandum also makes great hay of agent/principal
concepts, but an agent cannot sign high-value documents such as a will on behalf of a
principal even under the broadest durable power of attorney and even in the principle’s
presence. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Agency § 17, cmt. b (“The making of
affidavits as to knowledge and the execution of wills are illustrations of acts commonly
required by statute to be done personally”).
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IV. Potential Consequences of Unconstitutional Non-Presence Proxy
Signings
The Constitution provides:
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten
Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented
to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he
had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment
prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a law.”63
It takes an affirmative veto, or the adjournment of the Congressional session
before ten days (not including Sundays) elapse (a so-called “pocket veto”),
to keep a bill from becoming a law.
Congress approved the extension (until June 1, 2015) of the amendments
to FISA on May 26, 2011. As applied here, then, excluding Sundays, ten
days later would be June 7, 2011. These three provisions originally expired
at midnight on May 26, 2011. Assuming that the use of the autopen was
unconstitutional and thus a void act, then it is as if the President had taken
no action in the ten-day period, neither signing nor vetoing the renewal bill.
Since both houses of Congress were in session in June 2011, the renewal bill
has an effective date of June 8, 2011. There were, then, twelve days when
neither the old provisions nor their replacements were valid.
The legislation extended by four years three sections of FISA: (1) socalled roving wiretaps;64 (2) the library records provision (searches of
business records);65 and (3) lone wolf surveillance (individuals suspected of
terrorist activities who are not known to be connected to terrorist
organizations).66 Fortunately, these provisions had grandfather clauses
permitting them “to remain effective with respect to investigations that
began, or potential offenses that took place, before the sunset date.”67
Therefore, as applied to this particular piece of legislation, the gap in the
provisions’ effectiveness does not seem to be problematic except for
investigations and roving wiretaps beginning in the twelve-day gap period,
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U.S. Const. Article I, Section 7.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56 § 206
(2001), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2008).
65
Id. at § 215, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-2 (2008).
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Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, P.L. 108-458 § 6001(a) (2004),
codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)(C) (2008).
67
Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Extended Until June
1, 2015, Congressional Research Service (June 16, 2011). It is not clear why, then, the
White House felt it of utmost importance to not have a lapse of these three components of
the Patriot Act. The White House assistant press secretary, Nick Shapiro, expressed the
angst this way: “Failure to sign this legislation poses a significant risk to U.S. national
security.” New York Times, supra note 3.
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which would be illegal even now because they were never properly
authorized. Law enforcement agencies, for example, should check for any
roving wiretaps that were started during this twelve-day period and get them
reauthorized.
However, non-presence proxy signature certainly could be more
problematic for the renewal of other laws. Since most laws do not contain
grandfather clauses like those in the PATRIOT Act, the use of the nonpresence autopen (or human proxy) to sign legislation could still be a
significant issue in the future. Taking the roving wiretaps provision as an
example, absent the grandfathering language, the lapse would have meant
that the roving wiretaps authorized under this provision were illegal during
this period. This would have rendered any evidence gathered during this
period, or likely any evidence flowing from the fruit of its tree, unusable by
a prosecutor. It also would have meant that, because of the disruption,
government agents would have needed to obtain new warrants for any
roving wiretaps that were ongoing as of May 26, 2011. Since the
government would not have known that they needed to obtain new warrants,
they likely would not have done so. Therefore, the roving wiretaps that were
in place only under the authority of the original provision would still, to this
day, not be lawful.
One can also easily imagine that Congress might not be in session when
the ten-day period (not counting Sundays) expires. Very often, there is a
hurried push at the end of Congressional sessions to get legislation passed.
Many acts, then, are sent to the President for signature just as Congress is
adjourning. This would, of course, mean that a non-presence autopen or
human proxy signature would be tantamount to a veto by the President.
While beyond the scope of this Article, the solution to the presence
requirement does not, under current law, rest in having a copy of the original
bill presented by Congress sent to the President via electronic means (such
as facsimile or scanned and e-mailed) to have the President sign the copy
personally. Federal law requires that an enrolled bill, that is, one that has
passed both chambers of Congress, be printed on parchment or paper “of
suitable quality” and “sent” to the President.68 As the President’s Office of
Legal Counsel admitted in the Cedarbaum Memorandum, electronic
presentment and return is not the most natural reading of the law.69 The
Cedarbaum Memorandum states in summary:
In light of the novelty of electronic presentment and return,
and the need to ensure that the President and Congress – as
well as the public – share a common understanding of the
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1 U.S.C. §§ 106 & 107.
Cedarbaum Memorandum at 2 (“We think those statutory directives could be read as
encompassing electronic transmission, but that is not necessarily the most natural
reading.”).
69

means by which these fundamental steps in the lawmaking
process may be carried out, we recommend that, before
electronic presentment and return might be used, 1 U.S.C.
§§ 106, 106a, and 107 be amended to provide expressly for
the permissibility of electronic presentment and that the
President and Congress reach an agreement, whether by
statute or other means, concerning the permissibility of
electronic return of bills.70
Even if federal law is changed to allow for electronic presentment and
return, there are strong policy71 and constitutional arguments against
allowing electronic presentment and return, many of which are captured in
the Cedarbaum Memorandum. Indeed, the Cedarbaum Memorandum
concedes that “[a]s far as we are aware, [it] has been Congress’s unbroken
practice” to have House and Senate representatives sign one paper bill that
the President signs.72 The Cedarbaum Memorandum actually cites two prior
Office of Legal Counsel memoranda that conclude that the Constitution does
not permit electronic presentment and return.
We have in the past advised that this provision requires the
President to sign the enrolled bill actually signed by the
presiding officers of the House and Senate. See
Memorandum to the Files from Ralph W. Tarr, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re:
Presidential Signing of Bankruptcy Extension Act at 10-11
(June 13, 1984) (“[t]he Constitution appears to require that
the President sign the actual enrolled bill presented to him,
not a copy or facsimile thereof”) (“Tarr Memo”); see also
Memorandum to the Files from Jeffrey P. Singdahlsen,
Attorney-Adviser, Office of Legal Counsel, Re:
Preliminary Advice and Consideration Regarding Proposal
to Fax Continuing Resolution to the President While He
Was Abroad at 1-2 (Dec. 22, 1999) (“Singdahlsen Memo”).
We did so in part based on the provision’s wording and in
part based on the unbroken practice of presenting the copy
actually signed by the presiding officers.73
Having all three original signatures on a law makes for an important
70

Id.
Note, for example, that the federal Electronic Signatures Act, which provides that “an
electronic signature satisfies the law” as to contracts, is inapplicable to wills. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7001, 7003(a)(1). Similarly, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws were aware of the potential for fraud and other abuse in the will context and
included a provision specifically excluding the use of an electronic signature to execute a
testamentary document. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act of 1999, 7A U.S.A. 213
(2002). Similar policy reasoning should apply to the electronic presentment issue.
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Cedarbaum Memorandum at 19.
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Id. at 4.
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authentication and fraud-prevention mechanism.
V. Conclusion
The dangers of fraud and undue influence that prompted the enactment of
the proxy presence requirement contained in the English Statute of Frauds
almost 350 years ago continue to be of concern today, especially with
advancements in technology such as the autopen. Regardless of changing
technology, the safest method for avoiding fraud is the same today as
hundreds of years ago: have the principal sign a document in pen or require
that a proxy (whether human or autopen) do so in the presence of the
principal. This practice is most relevant where the stakes are highest, be it
signing wills or enacting legislation.
The state of the law surrounding proxy signatures has remained
amazingly constant through both English and American history. Presence is
clearly required for a proxy signature: period. This was the rock-solid law
when the constitution was written.
The Nielson Memorandum
acknowledges this with twenty-two citations – six of which relate to the law
of wills – before haphazardly attempting to explain this vast body of law
away in its shoddily-crafted footnote 11.
No one seems focused on the presence requirement: not the President, nor
the Republican House members who complained to the President, nor the
numerous legal commentators and scholars that we have heard from since
the autopen signing occurred. The use of the autopen, itself unproblematic,
seems to have eclipsed the more important issue of whether the president
was present when it was used.
While the consequences of this voided signature may not be great with
respect to the FISA extensions, future legislation signed in this manner may
not be so fortuitously crafted. By definition, if a non-presence proxy
signature is affixed to a bill, then time is of the essence. When time is of the
essence, the consequences of a voided signature are never greater. Since the
President has roughly twelve days to sign a bill, a non-presence proxy
signature could produce one of two unintended consequences. At best, it
would produce a twelve-day period during which the new legislation would
not be in effect. At worst, if Congress is not in session at the end of the
twelve-day period, it would amount to a pocket veto. Neither case is
consistent with well-ordered government.
Let the autopen episode not be a precedent for this or any other President
to follow. The Constitution does not allow for shortcuts.

